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Abstract 
 
The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI) is a commonly used 
tool for measuring critical thinking dispositions. However, research on the efficacy of the 
CCTDI in predicting good thinking about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. In 
this paper we report on our study that was designed to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI 
in this context, and take some first steps towards designing a better method for measuring 
strong sense critical thinking.   
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I. Introduction 
 
The main goal of general critical thinking instruction is to improve the quality of 
students’ reasoning on topics not dealt with directly in the critical thinking class, and in 
situations other than the critical thinking classroom. Getting students to think critically 
about their deeply held beliefs is recognized as particularly difficult because critical 
thinking skills, selectively applied, enable students to defend these beliefs from criticism 
and attack incongruent beliefs (Paul, 1992, p. 136; 1993, pp. 57-8, 137-8, 206-7, 329-30). 
 By “deeply held beliefs” we mean beliefs that have one or more of the following 
features:  
• They are held passionately, strongly, with a high degree of emotional intensity.   
• They are central to the believer’s worldview.  
• They are held dogmatically: that is, they are not readily abandoned or revised in 
the light of new evidence.  
The belief that Jesus is divine, the belief that people who vote for the left don’t 
understand politics, and the belief that eating meat is morally okay would all be examples 
provided they were sufficiently important to the participant. The participant need not be 
aware of holding such beliefs, or of holding them strongly, so long as it can be shown 
that she behaves as if she does.  
The ideal that critical thinking instruction aims at is what Richard Paul (Paul 
1993, pp. 137-8) calls “strong sense critical thinking” (SSCT): critical thinking that is not 
biased in favor of one’s own beliefs, but is applied as stringently to one’s own beliefs as 
it is to the beliefs of one’s opponents.  Paul contrasts this with “weak sense critical 
thinking” (WSCT): “critical thinking skills internalized in the service of one’s vested 
interests and desires” (Paul 2000, p. 258). Moreover, Brookfield (2003), Govier (1999, 
pp. 248–50), Mezirow (1990, p. 4), and Segal (1998) illustrate the connection between 
the stresses involved in having one‘s beliefs criticized and uncritical defensive reactions. 
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(See also Paul (1993, pp. 57–8, 137, 206–7, 329–30), Adler (1994, p. 108), Hahn (1992, 
p. 165), Irving & Williams (1995), Johnson (1992, pp. 73–4), and Kornblith (1999, p. 
183). 
 One of the keys to the success of a critical thinking intervention is imparting the 
will to think critically – a general disposition to think critically when critical thinking is 
called for – in addition to the ability to do so. Once a student decides to think critically 
about a topic, additional, more specific critical thinking dispositions come into play. The 
disposition to evaluate one’s own and alternative views by the same standards and the 
disposition to persevere through a prolonged or difficult thinking process, amongst 
others, determine the quality of students’ thinking once it has been switched on. Because 
of the importance of people’s deeply held beliefs in determining how they interact with 
others in the wider world, the disposition to think about such beliefs critically, and 
attendant dispositions that support good thinking, are particularly important both to 
promote and, ipso facto, to measure.  
 
II. The Project 
The Instruments  
The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI) is a tool that is 
commonly used to measure critical thinking dispositions in the field. See for example 
Bartlett & Cox (2002), Giddens & Gloeckner (2005), Hicks-Moore & Pastirik (2006), 
Nieto & Valenzuela (2012), Rudd & Hoover (2000), Sankaran & Dimitrijevic (2010), 
Stone et al. (2001), Ip et al. (2000). However, research on the efficacy of the CCTDI in 
predicting good thinking about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. The main aim 
of the present study was to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI in measuring the quality 
of students’ thinking about their own deeply held beliefs. This was done through 
comparison of CCTDI results with results from two other measures: the Revised 
Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS, Tobacyk, 2004) and a score from a semi-structured 
interview.  The outcome is important for a further study we hope to undertake that will 
compare alternative methods of delivery of the general critical thinking course to see 
which is most successful in promoting critical thinking about deeply held beliefs, that is, 
genuine strong sense critical thinking (SSCT).  This future study will require us to 
measure the quality of students’ thinking about these beliefs; hence our interest in 
determining what is a good way to measure it.  
 
The First Hypothesis  
One of our hypotheses was that CCTDI results would not correlate so well with 
the interview score for SSCT, because the CCTDI appears to measure test-takers’ 
opinions about some of their attitudinally relevant beliefs, values and intentions, rather 
than the dispositions themselves, and there is reason to think that judgments of these sort 
tend to be more positive than is justified. (See for example Helzer & Dunning (2012), pp. 
379-396). 
 
The Second Hypothesis 
 A second hypothesis was that lack of SSCT is indicated by the presence of any 
one deeply held belief which is pseudoscientific or anti-scientific, or which lacks good 
scientific backing even though it is a belief that could reasonably be expected to have 
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such backing if it were true.  The RPBS is a rough and ready survey of seven popular 
kinds of beliefs of this sort (e.g. witchcraft, precognition). We hypothesised that there 
would be a correlation between highest score on the RPBS and low scores for SSCT (as 
measured by scored interviews). We surmised this because all our participants had 
completed a general critical thinking course, and our expectation was that participants 
who were inclined towards thinking critically in the strong sense as shown by their high 
SSCT scores and who had powerful critical thinking tools at their disposal, would show a 
lower level of belief in paranormal items as measured by the RPBS. Likewise, 
participants who were not disposed to think critically in the strong sense as shown by low 
SSCT scores would score higher on the RPBS, because of their lack of interest in 
thinking critically about their own controversial beliefs and because of their new ability 
to fend off the critiques of others.  
Had it turned out that the RPBS scores performed better as predictors of 
individual participants’ SSCT scores than the CCTDI, that would have been a useful 
result for us, since the RPBS is free, quick to administer, and can be easily modified, 
unlike the CCTDI. In fact, however, neither the CCTDI nor the RPBS performed 
sufficiently well in the present study as predictors of individual participants’ SSCT for us 
to be confident about using them in our future research. Although some correlations were 
found, all were judged to be insufficient. We also found a surprisingly large gap between 
CCTDI scores (where scores were relatively good), and our interview results (where most 
participants did not score well). The RPBS performed better than the CCTDI in that 
respect. When taken as a single group, our participants showed a considerable lack of 
inclination to think critically about their own deeply held beliefs, as well as a high degree 
of belief in the kinds of paranormal statements included in the RPBS. This suggests that 
measuring beliefs in some epistemologically problematic claims might prove valuable in 
the development of an objective measure of SSCT. However, we have decided to use a 
modified version of our own semi-structured interview method in our own future 
research.  
III. Method 
 
There were 57 participants, all of whom had completed an introductory-level one-
semester course in critical thinking at the [university omitted from blind review copy] 
during the three years preceding the study. Participants were given two cinema vouchers 
as compensation for their efforts. Data from all participants was of sufficient quality to be 
included in the analysis.  At this initial stage no demographic data was collected. Data 
was collected using two paper and pencil questionnaires and a semi-structured interview.  
The first questionnaire given was the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS). 
This is a standardized measure of degree of belief in each of seven kinds of “paranormal” 
beliefs: Traditional Religious Belief, Psi, Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiritualism, 
Extraordinary Life Forms, and Precognition. It is comprised of 26 statements (e.g. 
“Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future;” “The soul continues to exist though 
the body may die;” “Witches do exist;” “A person’s thoughts can influence the 
movement of a physical object”). Participants indicate the strength of their 
agreement/disagreement with each statement on a seven-level Likert-like rating scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Scores for each of the seven kinds of paranormal 
belief were calculated by averaging the scores for three to four related statements. 
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Highest RPBS – the highest degree of belief in any one of the seven categories scored by 
each participant – was also calculated.  
 After completing the RPBS, participants were given thirty minutes to complete 
the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI). This instrument has 
been used internationally in research, education and business to measure critical thinking 
dispositions. It is comprised of 75 statements. To complete the inventory, participants 
need to indicate the strength of their agreement/disagreement on a six-level Likert-like 
rating scale. Participants’ responses were machine scored by Insight Assessment, who 
own and distribute the CCTDI. Every participant was given a score for each of the 
following characteristics: Truth-seeking, Open-mindedness, Inquisitiveness, Analyticity, 
Systematicity, Confidence in Reasoning, and Maturity of Judgment. They were also 
given a mean score, which is as close as the CCTDI gets to measuring a general or 
overall disposition towards critical thinking. A CCTDI score of “40 points or higher 
indicates a positive inclination or affirmation of the characteristic” (Giancarlo & Facione, 
2001, p. 37). 
Next came a three-part semi-structured interview process to determine a strong 
sense critical thinking score (SSCT). After taking the CCTDI participants were 
interviewed by one of the researchers.  One researcher was the main interviewer, 
conducting 55 of the 57, while a second researcher conducted two of the interviews. The 
interview normally took twenty to thirty minutes and was divided into three parts, each 
geared towards answering a different question. First, participants were asked to rate the 
influence of the critical thinking course on the quality of their thinking in general 
(Interview Question 1, Q1 hereafter). Second, participants were asked to rate the 
influence of the critical thinking course on the quality of their thinking about their own 
deeply held beliefs (Interview Question 2, Q2 hereafter). The meaning of “deeply held 
beliefs” was explained to participants briefly in a way that is consistent with but not 
necessarily as detailed as that given above. Both these questions were later scored by 
each of the researchers scoring independently on a seven-level Likert-like rating scale (1 
= a very negative effect, 7 = a very positive effect). If a participant’s answer was not 
sufficiently clear, he or she was explicitly asked to rate changes on this scale.  
In the third part of the interview (Interview Question 3, Q3 hereafter), the 
participant and the interviewer engaged in a discussion about one or more of the 
participant’s controversial deeply held beliefs (“controversial” was explained as “such 
that intelligent and educated people might disagree about it”). Generally two deeply held 
beliefs were discussed, but in some interviews discussing one belief provided enough 
information about the participant’s ability and inclination towards SSCT, and in other 
interviews three or more were needed. Typically the first belief to be discussed was 
chosen from amongst statements the participant rated six or seven in the RPBS. Having 
discussed one such claim with the participant in detail, the interviewer would typically 
ask the participant to volunteer a deeply held controversial belief that would be suitable 
as a second topic for discussion. In many cases the participants did not come up with a 
suitable belief for discussion: consequently many of the interviews used one chosen by 
the interviewer, “It is morally okay to eat meat.”  
For each belief discussed, participants were first asked to give the reasoning 
behind their belief. They were then presented with arguments that undermined their 
reasons, and asked to volunteer their thoughts again. The process was normally repeated 
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twice for each belief discussed. To help elicit the needed data participants were also 
asked questions like these: 
• What are your main reasons for thinking that P is true/false? 
• Suppose you met someone who had different beliefs about P, because they think 
that Q or R. How do you think you might respond to them about this issue? 
• Has this discussion changed your view about P? 
• In the light of this discussion, do you think that in the days and weeks following 
the interview you will think about P further, and perhaps try to find out more 
information about the topic? 
Then, four raters, two of whom were the original interviewers, used audio recordings of 
the interviews and a scoring guide, to independently rate the behaviour of each 
participant on a seven-level Likert-like rating scale for its conformity with the following 
claim: “The participant displays strong sense critical thinking about his/her own deeply 
held controversial beliefs.” 
The scoring guide included definitions of SSCT versus WSCT or non-critical 
thinking, as well as lists of typical behaviours indicative of these (see Appendix). The 
guide also defined a scale progressing from 1 (All the behaviours exhibited conform or 
are sufficiently close to the definition and examples of WSCT or non-critical thinking) to 
7 (All the behaviours exhibited conform or are sufficiently close to the SSCT definition 
and list of examples).  
Interview Question 3 was the interview question we were most interested in. We 
hoped that there might be sufficiently high correlations between a participant’s SSCT, as 
judged by the researchers on the basis of Q3 responses, and results on either the RPBS or 
the CCTDI, such that in future we could use one of these standardised tests rather than 
the time-consuming interview method to determine how critically students are thinking 
about their own deeply held beliefs, as well as the level of their inclination to do so.  
 
IV. Results 
 
On the RPBS, scores for each of seven kinds of paranormal belief were calculated 
for each participant by averaging their scores for three or four related statements. We 
were particularly interested in each participant’s highest RPBS (the highest of these seven 
scores). For nine participants, the highest RPBS was 7; for twelve participants the highest 
RPBS was between 6 and 7, tailing off gradually, while at the other end of the scale three 
participants had a highest RPBS of 1. The mean for the highest RPBS was 4.65, 
indicating substantial paranormal belief in general among the 57 partiicpants. 
The mean CCTDI score of 49 of the 57 participants indicated “a positive 
inclination or affirmation” (Giancarlo & Facione, 2001) towards critical thinking. The 
scores of the other eight indicate “ambiguity or ambivalence toward the characteristic” 
(Ibid, 2001); none of the participants were negatively disposed toward critical thinking 
according to this measure. The CCTDI means of all the participants for each of the seven 
categories are either in the positive range (above a value of 40), or in the case of truth-
seeking (mean of 38) and systematicity (mean of 39.8), very close to it. That is to say, our 
participants scored rather well on the CCTDI. The average for Mean CCTDI was 43.77. 
In response to Interview Question 1, 53 of the 57 participants thought that the 
critical thinking course had a positive effect on the quality of their thinking. The 
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responses to Interview Question 2 were quite different: only 32 of the participants 
thought that the course had no effect on the quality of their thinking about their deeply 
held beliefs, whereas 25 thought it had a positive effect on their thinking about such 
beliefs. The means for Q1 and Q2 are 5.80 and 4.84 respectively. 
Interview Question 3 was intended as a direct measure of participants’ SSCT. We 
averaged the scores given to a participant by the four raters. The highest score, reflecting 
the participant who displayed the greatest amount of SSCT, was 5.75 (out of a possible 
7). The average across all participants was 2.25, indicating widespread deficiency in 
SSCT. 32 of the 57 participants scored between 1 and 2 inclusive, showing that over half 
of the participants exhibited a large majority of behaviours that were outlined in our 
scoring guide as being examples of WSCT. Most significant of all, only six participants 
scored 4 or above (a 4 was given when the participant’s behaviours were evenly divided 
between strong sense and weak sense critical thinking behaviours). Of those six, only two 
scored above 5.  
 
Table 1: RPBS, CCTDI and Interview Means 
  
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
RPBS Traditional Religious Belief 3.57 2.16 
RPBS Psi 2.70 1.53 
RPBS Witchcraft 3.12 1.88 
RPBS Superstition 1.59 1.04 
RPBS Spiritualism 3.32 1.83 
RBPS Extraordinary Life Forms 2.91 1.26 
RBPS Precognition 2.82 1.35 
RPBS Highest 4.65 1.937 
CCTDI Truth Seeking 38.00 5.57 
CCTDI Open-mindedness 43.82 5.74 
CCTDI Inquisitiveness 49.05 5.49 
CCTDI Analyticity 45.49 5.32 
CCTDI Systematicity 39.84 5.87 
CCTDI Confidence in Reasoning 44.75 6.06 
CCTDI Maturity of Judgment 45.70 6.05 
CCTDI Mean 43.77 3.49 
Interview Question 1 5.80 0.79 
Interview Question 2 4.84 0.86 
Interview Question 3 2.25 1.13 
 
The scoring of Q3 required raters to identify the behaviours of the participants as 
behaviours characteristic of SSCT or behaviours characteristic of WSCT. There were 
significant positive correlations between the four raters: correlations between pairs of 
raters range from .572 to .762.  We had hoped for inter-rater reliability of .8 or above: 
however, the inter-rater correlations are high enough to show the interview-rating method 
has potential as a measure of SSCT. 
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Table 2: Inter-rater Pearson Correlations, Interview Q3 
 Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 3 
Rater 2 .762**   
Rater 3 .670** .608**  
Rater 4 .595** .594** .572** 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
There was a significant negative correlation between the highest RPBS scores and 
SSCT scores for three out of four raters, although it did not correlate significantly for the 
mean of all four raters. However, the negative correlation of SSCT scores with the mean 
for the highest RPBS scores was very close to being a significant correlation. There was a 
significant positive correlation between Mean CCTDI and SSCT as scored by two of the 
raters, and between Mean CCTDI and Mean SSCT. The highest correlation between 
Mean SSCT and any other individual item was with CCTDI Inquisitiveness (.392). 
Curiously, this was also the CCTDI item where our participants scored highest (Mean 
49.05).  
 
Table 3: RPBS and CCTDI Pearson Correlations with Interview Q3 
 
Rater 1 Rater 2 Rater 3 Rater 4 Mean 
RPBS Traditional Religious 
Belief 
-.289* -.255 -.339** -.033 -.232 
RPBS Psi -.173 -.163 -.244 .080 -.126 
RPBS Witchcraft -.122 -.158 -.241 .101 -.091 
RPBS Superstition -.156 -.204 -.145 .070 -.113 
RPBS Spiritualism -.148 -.112 -.115 .206 -.030 
RPBS Extraordinary Life 
Forms 
-.045 -.095 .050 .286* .058 
RPBS Precognition -.207 -.229 -.151 .111 -.133 
RPBS Highest -.316* -.298* -.297* .035 -.228 
CCTDI Truth-seeking .276* .360** .091 .113 .236 
CCTDI Open-mindedness .252 .288* .294* .229 .308* 
CCTDI Inquisitiveness .355** .501** .252 .254 .392** 
CCTDI Analyticity .246 .284* .120 -.026 .161 
CCTDI Systematicity .112 .058 -.088 -.061 .001 
CCTDI Confidence in 
Reasoning 
.163 .265* -.047 .106 .152 
CCTDI Maturity of Judgment .089 .188 .056 -.077 .071 
CCTDI Mean .343** .446** .147 .118 .301* 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
V. Discussion 
 
Although we hypothesised a mismatch between Q3 and CCTDI results, due to the 
influence of self-reporting in the latter, the extent of the difference seems to us to be 
 8 
problematic. The mostly good CCTDI results indicated that our participants were by and 
large disposed towards thinking critically. Q3 results showed that this was not the case, at 
least where participants’ own deeply held beliefs were involved. This provides additional 
empirical support for the existence of the problem of weak sense critical thinking. The 
same can be said about the differences between Q1 and Q2 results: While almost all 
participants claimed that the critical thinking course improved the quality of their 
thinking, most thought that the course had no effect on the quality of their thinking about 
their deeply held beliefs. Of those who did claim some improvement, several thought that 
the course helped them clarify and strengthen their prior beliefs, and that it helped them 
improve the quality of their responses to others in arguments.  
The problem of WSCT, then, may be an important underlying similarity 
explaining the disparities between Q1 and Q2 results, and those between the CCTDI and 
Q3 results. Given the importance of critical thinking dispositions in teaching for strong 
sense critical thinking, as attested by Paul (1993, pp. 325-327) and Siegel (1988, p. 39), 
and given that a majority of participants readily admitted lack of transfer to their own 
deeply held beliefs, one may rightly ask whether the CCTDI is scored rather 
optimistically. This was particularly evident with CCTDI Inquisitiveness, where our 
participants’ mean was remarkably close to the high range (49.05). According to the 
CCTDI Test Manual (Facione & Facione, 2010, p. 20), scores in the 40-50 range 
“indicate consistent endorsement and valuation of the attitude,” and scores in the 50-60 
range “indicate that the attribute or attitude is a positive habit of mind and likely to factor 
into the individual’s approach to all higher order thinking (reflective problem definition 
and problem solving), particularly when the situation is of high consequence.” Levels of 
the self-directed inquisitiveness that is so important for SSCT – the kind that prompts us 
to question our own fundamental assumptions – do not seem to be in line with the CCTDI 
scale.  
It was hoped that the scoring of Q3 would provide an accurate measure of 
participants’ SSCT, acting as a standard with which to evaluate the suitability of the 
CCTDI and the RPBS for future research. However, in order to be completely confident 
in our use Q3 for this purpose, the correlations between the scores given by the different 
raters would need to be .8 or above, and even the best-correlated pair of raters do not 
quite meet this standard. This means that the significant but low correlations found 
between Q3 and the RPBS may well increase, once our interview and scoring methods 
improve. The approach taken by the RPBS may also yield better results if the kinds of 
beliefs measured were specifically tailored to include all the major paranormal beliefs 
currently popular with students in [country omitted from blind review copy] (our broad 
demographic). Therefore, measuring degree of belief in some epistemologically 
problematic claims could still have a role to play in the development of a standardised 
measure of SSCT. A somewhat similar approach is taken in Williams, Aspiranti & Krohn 
(2010) using political beliefs. 
The lack of sufficiently high inter-rater reliability in the scoring of SSCT does not 
have a similar import with regards to the suitability of the CCTDI. The largely positive 
CCTDI results and the mostly negative Q3 results mean that the CCTDI cannot serve as a 
proxy for a more direct measure of SSCT even if the low correlations between the two 
were somewhat increased.  
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With a view to improving inter-rater reliability for the next stage of our research, we 
conducted a qualitative analysis of discrepant Q3 ratings in order to identify possible 
sources of these discrepancies between the raters. Five were identified:  
1. Answers to Q1 (What effect does the participant think the course had on the 
quality of his/her thinking?) and Q2 (What effect does the participant think the 
course has on the quality of his/her thinking about his/her own deeply held 
beliefs?) were known to the raters at the time of rating. This probably influenced 
the rating of Q3 in some cases, especially considering the overlap between Q2 and 
Q3. In future iterations Q1 and Q2 will be included in a questionnaire that will not 
be accessible to the raters. 
2. Another possible source of discrepancies in the scoring of Q3 arises from 
differing views about whether the quality of the initial arguments given by the 
participant in support of their view was to be taken into consideration.  After the 
belief to be discussed was decided, the interviewer posed a question such as “Can 
you give me your main reasons for believing that P?”; to which the interviewee 
responded. Sometimes these initial arguments were very poor.  Rater 3 took the 
quality of these initial arguments into consideration when rating Q3. The 
participants were asked to provide good reasons, or their best reasons, for the 
beliefs under discussion. On Rater 3’s view, if they put forward a bad argument 
without noticing the problems with it or revising it, then this displayed a lack of 
SSCT. Raters 2 and 4 did not take the quality of the initial arguments into 
consideration. Some of the topics discussed were not ones the participants had 
given much prior thought to, and, Raters 2 and 4 thought, it was their responses to 
the interviewer’s counterarguments that revealed the quality of the interviewee’s 
thinking.  For the most part Rater 1 focussed on the counterarguments as the basis 
for assessment: however if the initial arguments presented were especially poor, 
Rater 1 did note this down as a possible signal for behaviours to come. This 
discrepancy could be solved by either ignoring initial arguments uniformly, or by 
asking the participants more forcefully to give only arguments that they consider 
good, while giving them a few moments to gather their thoughts.  
3. The raters were not always neutral with respect to the controversial beliefs 
discussed. We cannot completely discount the possibility that our own opinions 
influenced our rating, although we certainly did our best to avoid such influences.  
4. Two members of the team took on a dual role of both interviewers and raters. One 
way in which this might have had an influence on the rating of Q3 is that 
interviewers had more information about the participants, being in a position to 
notice their body language, for example; another is that the interviewers might 
have over-rated the quality of their own arguments, and underrated the 
participant’s responses. These roles will need to be separated. 
5. Lastly – and this may have been the root cause of all of the above – only three 
interviews were rated together at the start of the rating period. We believe that 
comparing ten interviews and ratings at the outset would have been much more 
likely to help us identify these potential problems and calibrate our rating 
accordingly. (Thanks to Michael Scriven for pointing this out.) 
 
VI. Conclusion 
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Neither the CCTDI nor the RPBS were shown to be useful as a proxy for a more 
direct measure of SSCT about deeply held beliefs, although the general approach taken 
by the RPBS may still be of some use. We see no overwhelming obstacle to reaching the 
desired level of inter-rater reliability, and so our semi-structured interview, and Q3 in 
particular, seems most promising for our project as a potential direct measure of how 
critically people are thinking about their deeply held beliefs. We hope in future research 
to modify our interviewing and interview-scoring methods in order to achieve a level of 
inter-rater reliability that will make some variant of Q3 a credible direct measure of 
SSCT. Teaching for strong sense critical thinking about deeply held beliefs is an 
important goal for critical thinking educators, and developing pedagogical methods that 
achieve this goal requires being able to accurately measure how critically students are 
thinking about their deeply held beliefs.  
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Appendix: Excerpts From the Interview Scoring Guide 
 
Strong sense critical thinking is displayed in behaviors like these: 
 
1. Seriously considering opposing arguments when confronted with them. 
2. Recognising and internalizing the import of opposing arguments when confronted 
with them. 
3. Showing genuine interest in opposing arguments or evidence.  
4. Questioning the perspectives, beliefs, and inferences one is personally invested in. 
5. Sympathetically and accurately paraphrasing opposing arguments in a genuine 
attempt to recognize their strengths and significance. 
6. Reasoning from within opposing perspectives in a genuine attempt to recognize 
their strengths and significance, as well as the limitations of one’s own 
perspective. 
7. Showing a genuine interest in basing one’s beliefs on the best available evidence.  
8. Showing a genuine interest in seeking opposing evidence. 
 
Weak sense critical thinking and non-critical thinking are the opposite of strong 
sense critical thinking and are displayed in behaviors such as these: 
 
1. Paying lip-service to the import of opposing arguments when confronted with 
them as a rhetorical device, or a prelude to counter-attack. 
2. Lack of interest in opposing arguments or evidence. Lack of inclination to 
investigate opposing arguments or evidence further. Passing the burden of proof 
to one’s opponents. Thinking that it is reasonable to keep one’s deeply held 
controversial belief until one’s opponents supply incontrovertible evidence or 
proof. 
3. Questioning only perspectives, beliefs, and inferences one is not personally 
invested in, or beliefs and inferences that are contrary or contradictory to those 
one is personally invested in. 
4. Application of the skills taught in the critical thinking course to arguments 
opposing one’s views more than to one’s own reasoning. 
5. Refusal to reason from within opposing perspectives. 
6. Criticising opposing evidence unfairly.  
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7. Judging the quality of the evidence based on its agreement with one’s beliefs.  
8. Repeatedly and only defending one’s own beliefs and attacking the opposition. 
9. An admission that no arguments will ever be good enough to elicit change of 
belief. 
10. Shielding one’s beliefs from criticism by claiming that everyone has a right to 
their own beliefs.  
 
Although we don’t test for argument analysis and fallacy identification skills in this 
research, poor – and only poor – argument analysis and fallacy identification skills are 
relevant to scoring the third scale of the interview. The reason for this is our use of 
Richard Paul’s three-way distinction between SSCT, WSCT, and unskilled or non-critical 
thinking. Low dexterity with or use of argument analysis and fallacy identification skills 
counts against SSCT because SSCT is skilled thinking. But high dexterity with or correct 
and common use of argument analysis and fallacy identification skills does not count in 
favour of SSCT because WSCT can be just as skilled as SSCT. It’s just that in WSCT, 
skills are applied apologetically rather than fairmindedly. 
